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DAVID M. GOLD
C o n s t it u t io n a l  P roblem s in  M aine  
D u r in g  t h e  C iv il  W ar E r a , 1857-1872
Most studies o f Civil W ar constitutionalism  focus on the 
U nited  States Suprem e C ourt and  on acts o f  the national 
governm ent, bu t the Civil W ar was also a constitutional 
crisis fo r the states. State judiciaries had  to face problem s 
posed by the Dred Scott case concerning the political rights 
o f blacks; challenges to personal liberty laws raised by 
N ortherners  who sought to appease the South; threats 
from  patriotic mobs to the civil liberties o f  dissenters; 
issues involving the power o f governm ent to tax and spend 
at a tim e o f m ounting public indebtedness. Between 1857 
and  1872, the Maine Suprem e Judicial C ourt produced a 
num ber o f notable opinions addressing these and o ther 
constitutional questions stem m ing from  the national crisis.
T h e  U nited States Suprem e C ourt’s Dred Scott decision 
o f  1857 provided the first occasion for the Maine court to 
pass upon  an issue raised by the sectional confrontation. 
In  the principal opinion o f that case, C hief Justice Roger 
B. T aney  wrote that the authors o f  the Declaration o f 
Independence  and the Constitution had  not in tended for 
U nited States citizenship to be open to the degraded  black 
race. A lth o u g h  the  M aine leg isla tu re  d ec lared  the  
Suprem e C o u rt’s decision to be “not binding in law or 
conscience,” Dred Scott clearly im periled the political rights 
o f  M aine’s blacks, who had been voting u n d er the state 
constitu tion’s g ran t o f suffrage to all male United States 
citizens at least twenty-one years old. Some Republicans 
proposed  am ending the constitution to protect the N egro 
franchise; bu t the state senate, acting un d er an unusual 
constitutional provision requiring  the suprem e judicial 
cou rt to ren d e r advisory opinions upon  request o f the
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legislature or executive, decided first to ask the court 
w hether “free colored persons, o f A frican descent,” 
resident in the state for the prescribed period, could vote 
u n d er existing law.1
Given the composition of the court, the answer was a 
foregone conclusion. Four of the eight judges had been 
Republicans as early as 1855, and at least one m ore later 
jo in ed  them . Two, Seth May and  W oodbury Davis, 
boasted long records o f antislavery activity, including 
m em bership in the Liberty party. Jo h n  A ppleton, who 
would be appointed chief justice du ring  the war, was a 
friend  and correspondent o f abolitionist senator Charles 
Sum ner. O f the two Democratic m em bers of the bench, 
one, Richard Rice, had belonged to the Hamlin wing of his 
party before the future vice president tu rned  to the 
Republicans.2
T he initial question for the court was, or should have 
been, w hether it was bound by the Dred Scott decision. 
Since in add ition  to its p ro n o u n cem en ts  on black 
citizenship the United States Suprem e C ourt had in effect 
held that Congress had no power to keep slavery out o f the 
western territories, this question was crucially im portant to 
Republicans, who were com m itted to forestalling the 
spread o f slavery. If  the decision were indeed binding, 
then, as one Southern paper declared, “Southern opinion 
upon  the subject o f southern  slavery . . is now the 
suprem e law of the land and opposition to southern 
opinion upon this subject is now opposition to the 
C o n s titu tio n , an d  m orally  tre a so n  ag a in st th e  
G overnm ent.” By the same token, if T aney’s position on 
black citizenship were the suprem e law, then o f course 
blacks had no right to vote under the Maine C onstitution.3
Only Democratic Judge Joshua Hathaway m aintained 
that Dred Scott determ ined the question before the court. 
He argued that the constitutional provisions stipulating
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John Appleton, 1804-1891
that m em bers o f Congress be U nited States citizens and 
giving Congress the power to establish uniform  rules o f 
n a tu ra liz a tio n  to g e th e r  m a n d a te d  u n ifo rm ity  o f  
citizenship laws. T h e  Suprem e C ourt had the power to 
settle conflicts am ong state citizenship laws, he continued. 
It had done that in Dred Scott, and as long as the Dred Scott 
decision stood, only those blacks who themselves o r whose 
ancestors had come from  Africa as free men could be 
citizens and vote.4
T h e  m ajority  ig n o red  the  m a tte r  o f  Dred Scott’s 
conclusiveness and hardly took note o f  the decision at all.
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In a fairly short opinion probably designed to minimize 
controversy and unite the court as m uch as possible, Judge 
Rice and four colleagues relied on the familiar theory that 
for individuals born  in the U nited States, national 
citizenship derived from state citizenship.5 O ne o f the 
most im portant tests o f state citizenship was the right to 
vote. While women, children, and some o ther citizens did 
not have the right, Rice could think o f no instance where 
suffrage had been granted by a state to non-citizens. 
Observing that the Maine Constitutional Convention o f 
1820 had rejected a proposal to explicitly exclude Negroes 
from  the franchise, Rice concluded in circular fashion that 
since blacks in Maine could vote and since voting was a 
prim ary test o f citizenship, M aine’s blacks were state and 
therefore national citizens who were guaranteed the right 
to vote by the state constitution.6
Davis and A ppleton refused to concur in an opinion that 
let the Dred Scott decision stand unm olested and left the 
door open for o ther states to underm ine blacks’ claims to 
citizenship simply by prohibiting them  from voting. They 
insisted that Dred Scott was not binding on the Maine 
court — Appleton arguing that the Suprem e C ourt’s nine 
separate opinions, only three o f which specifically denied 
black citizenship, did not constitute an authoritative 
statem ent of the law, and Davis contending that suffrage 
was a state question which federal courts had no power to 
settle.7
Both judges also attacked the historical foundations of 
T aney’s holding. Drawing upon a wide range o f sources, 
Appleton dem onstrated that birth and allegiance ra ther 
than race or political privilege had always and everywhere 
been regarded as the chief criteria o f citizenship. T hen, 
exam ining the Articles o f Confederation, various state 
c o n s titu tio n s  an d  th e  d eb a tes  s u r ro u n d in g  th e ir  
ratification, and judicial and legislative material bearing
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on the issue, he showed that free blacks had been 
A m erican  citizens betw een the Revolution and  the 
a d o p tio n  o f  the C o n stitu tio n . C lose study  o f the  
Constitution itself and the subsequent diplomatic practice 
o f the United States governm ent convinced Appleton 
“that there is no prohibition in the Constitution o f the 
U nited States, expressed o r implied, to free men of 
African descent becoming citizens o f a state, and as 
such . . . citizens o f the United States.”8
An astute lawyer, Appleton went on to prove Taney 
w rong on the chief justice’s own grounds. In arguing that 
the Declaration o f Independence and the Constitution 
had been written for the benefit o f whites only, Taney 
purpo rted  to show that public opinion at the time o f the 
nation’s founding had been favorably disposed toward 
slavery. Even if Taney were correct, said Appleton, the 
point was irrelevant because “the necessary degradation of 
the slave affords no reason for the denial o f citizenship to 
the free m an.” But Taney was not correct. No historical 
facts were better established, wrote Appleton, than that 
du ring  the Revolutionary period blacks had served in the 
army, taken the oath of allegiance, held real estate, and 
been regarded and continued to be regarded as citizens in 
at least several o f the states. “If  these things be so,” he 
continued, “and that they are so cannot be denied or even 
doubted, and if they had been known to the learned Chief 
Justice, his conclusions would have been different, for he 
says, 'every person and every class and description of 
persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the constitution 
recognized as citizens of the several states, became also citizens oj 
this new political body.’ His published opinion, therefore, 
rests  u p o n  a re m a rk a b le  an d  m ost u n fo r tu n a te  
m isapprehension of facts, and his real opinion upon the 
actual facts must be considered as in entire and cordial 
concurrence with that of his learned dissenting associates 
[Curtis and McLean].”9
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Davis presented a similar although m uch shorter b rief 
on the foundations o f citizenship and  the status o f blacks 
in the early days o f the republic. But he would not for a 
m om ent concede, even for the sake o f argum ent, that 
T aney’s premises m ight have been valid. Instead, with all 
the fervor o f the deeply religious, form er Liberty party 
lawyer that he was, he argued that the Constitution was an 
antislavery docum ent incorporating the natural-rights 
ideals of the Declaration o f Independence. T he contrast 
with May, also an old Liberty hand, was striking. No less 
opposed to slavery than Davis, May nevertheless believed 
that the Constitution sanctioned the “peculiar institution,” 
at least in the Southern states.10 But Davis adhered  to the 
constitutional interpretation form ulated by Salmon P. 
Chase and o ther Liberty m en in the 1830s and ’40s that 
took the Declaration as its starting point. T he old idea o f 
freedom  for a privileged class at the expense of others 
could never have inspired or justified the Revolution, 
wrote Davis; if the Declaration had been a m ere “compact 
o f [the N egro’s] oppressors for their own advantage . . .  a 
decent respect for the opinions of m ankind should have 
kept its authors silent.” But the Declaration was no such 
thing. Rather, it was “a heroic utterance of great truths, 
for all m en,” so understood and intended by the Founding 
Fathers, who anticipated a general em ancipation o f the 
slaves. Davis noted that the Constitution’s fram ers had 
carefully avoided using the word slavery in the docum ent. 
Q uoting Madison, he observed that the word service had 
been used instead of servitude in the so-called fugitive slave 
clause so that slavery could eventually be abolished 
w ithout a constitutional am endm ent.11
A ppleton’s and Davis’s opinions represented  m ore than 
a judicial refutation of the Dred Scott decision. They also 
symbolized the strength o f the N orthern  and especially the 
Republican com m itm ent to the American ideal o f equality 
before the law. As H erm an Belz has rem arked, the N orth
132
went to war not simply to preserve the Union, but also to 
m aintain that ideal: “G overnm ent operating  th rough  
majority rule and founded  on the idea that all m en were 
created equal, so that none should be governed w ithout his 
consent, was the basis o f the republican system that 
no rtherners  identified with the Constitution and the 
U n io n .” B oth  A p p le to n  an d  Davis a rr iv ed  at the  
conclusion o f racial equality from  the prem ise that 
governm ent could not legitimately discrim inate am ong 
d if fe re n t classes o f  the popu lace  on any g rounds. 
According to A ppleton, all popular governm ents rested 
on the great principle o f “the equality o f all before the law 
“T he Cornish m iner burrow ing in the earth , the princely 
noblem an in his palatial residence, or the beggar at his 
g a te , a re  all a like m em b ers  o f  th e  sam e civil 
co m m u n ity  — fellow  sub jec ts  a n d  fellow  c itiz e n s .” 
Similarly, Davis regarded  racial discrim ination by the state 
as a form  o f class oppression. U nder a free governm ent, 
he said, the majority had no m ore license to abuse a racial 
minority than a privileged aristocracy had to tram ple upon 
the rights o f the people as a whole.12
M aine’s Dem ocrats ridiculed the ir suprem e court’s 
response to the Dred Scott decision, but the Republican 
can d id a te  fo r g o v ern o r a p p lau d ed  it, singling  o u t 
A ppleton’s opinion as “one o f the most com plete and best 
fortified argum ents which has ever em anated from  any 
bench.” However, as the election o f 1860 approached, 
Republicans began to blunt the edge of their militancy in 
the hope o f appealing to a broad spectrum  of voters. This 
tactical shift displeased some m em bers o f the party. 
A ppleton wrote to Congressm an Israel W ashburn that 
“T he idea o f ignoring the distinctive doctrines o f the 
Republican party and then  going before the people simply 
for the spoils is utterly absurd .” But the party  nom inated 
Lincoln over the m ore radical William H. Seward and 
toned  down the provocative language of its 1856 platform .
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As war clouds gathered, some Republicans in Maine and 
elsewhere began to w onder w hether they should not make 
concessions to Southern feelings, perhaps by repealing 
N orthern  personal liberty laws. These laws, designed to 
protect free N orthern  blacks from slave catchers in pursuit 
o f fugitives and to limit slave hunting  on N orthern  soil, 
had limited practical effect; but as one historian has 
rem arked, “their greatest significance lay in their use, by 
both sides, as symbols around which clustered all o f the 
em otional issues which separated the two antagonistic 
sections of the R epublic/’13
Following the fiercely contested re tu rn  o f A nthony 
Burns from  New England to Virginia under the federal 
Fugitive Slave Law14 in 1855, the Maine legislature, which 
twelve years earlier had rejected a personal liberty law, 
passed a statute forbidding state judges to take cognizance 
o f cases arising under the federal act and providing that 
no state officer “shall, in his official capacity, arrest 
anyone” claimed as a fugitive slave. Despite the strength o f 
antislavery sentim ent in Maine, the law encountered  
opposition from  the first as an unw arranted affront to the 
South and a threat to the Union. Democratic Governor 
Samuel Wells felt that the expense o f trying to recover a 
runaway so far from the South deprived the law of any 
practical effect. “But in any event,” he told the legislature, 
“ all such laws are  ob jec tionab le . T h ey  in d ica te  a 
disposition to escape from  our constitutional obligations. 
We ought not to expect to enjoy all that is agreeable in our 
national relations, while we repudiate what is uncongenial 
to ou r tastes. We should never give our consent to a law, 
which is not required by strong necessity, when it is 
directly calculated to create an animosity between the 
inhabitants o f d ifferent states.”15
In 1857 the statutes o f Maine underw ent a general 
revision, resulting in a rearrangem ent and rew ording o f 
the several sections of the personal liberty law and the
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addition o f a statute requiring  county attorneys to aid at 
public expense anyone arrested  as a fugitive slave. T he 
revised law provided tha t “No sh e riff . ..  o r o ther officer 
o f this State, shall arrest o r detain, o r aid in so d o in g ,.. . 
any person on account o f a claim on him as a fugitive 
slave.” Unlike the original personal liberty law, this statute 
did no t expressly limit its effect to the actions o f state 
officers “in their official capacity.” In  1861 G overnor 
Israel W ashburn denied that either the 1855 or the 1857 
law had been passed in an attem pt to evade constitutional 
duties; but in light o f the imbroglio caused by the omission 
o f the lim iting phrase in 1857, he u rged  a reexam ination 
of the revised law. Accordingly, on February 13 the House 
o f  R e p re se n ta tiv e s  r e f e r r e d  th e  q u es tio n  o f  
constitutionality to the state suprem e court.16
By now the court was even m ore strongly Republican 
than at the time of Dred Scott, fo rm er W hig governor and 
ea rly  R e p u b lic an  E d w ard  K en t h av in g  rep la ced  
H athaw ay. H ow ever, as A ppleton  w rote to C harles 
Sum ner, there seem ed to be “a strange anxiety on the part 
o f some o f the C ourt to find som ething wrong at hom e.” 
W ith seven S outhern  states having already declared 
themselves out o f the U nion and  even some Republicans 
pressing for repeal o f the personal liberty law, such 
anxiety was understandable. A majority o f the court found 
th e  1857 v e rs io n  o f  th e  p e rso n a l lib e rty  law 
unconstitutional. C hief Justice Jo h n  T enney  and associates 
Cutting, May, and Goodenow contented themselves with 
declaring the act in conflict with that p art o f the Fugitive 
Slave Law requiring  all good citizens to aid in the law’s 
execution. Because the revised Maine statute om itted the 
phrase “in his official capacity,” they said, it prohibited 
state officers from  rendering  such aid even as private 
citizens. T herefo re  it contravened the federal act and  was 
unconstitu tional u n d er the suprem acy clause o f the 




Davis and Rice penned  m ore interesting and forceful 
opinions focusing on the constitutionality o f the Fugitive 
Slave Law itself. Once again in sharp contrast to May, who 
simply observed that the United States Suprem e C ourt 
had already upheld  the statute, Davis even questioned 
w hether the law’s constitutional foundation, the fugitive 
slave clause, really could be applied to slaves at all. T hat 
provision, he argued, elaborating on his earlier response to 
Dred Scott, did not use the word slavery. Rather, it referred  
to “personfs] held to service or labor” — that is, to free 
persons, such as sailors and apprentices, and not to articles 
o f property. While the fram ers no doubt m eant to apply 
the clause to slaves, he continued, "they did not mean to 
use language that could properly be applied to slaves. T here  
was no inadvertance or mistake. They meant to use 
language that could not be applied to slaves, because they 
believed that slavery was speedily to be abolished.”18
But even if the clause did pertain to slaves, Davis went 
on, the Fugitive Slave Law violated the Constitution in 
several respects. It called for what was in effect a summary 
extradition hearing; but instead of being extradited for 
trial, the prisoner was to be tu rned  over “to a private 
claimant, who may sell him at auction the m om ent he 
crosses the line o f a slave State.” Such a law, subjecting a 
person to the loss o f his liberty without a trial by ju ry  
according to common-law rules, was ‘‘unconstitutional and 
v o id .” Davis f u r th e r  a rg u e d  th a t  by m ak in g  th e  
determ ination of the fugitive slave tribunal final and 
u n a p p e a la b le , the  fe d e ra l s ta tu te  v io la ted  the  
constitutional guarantee o f habeas corpus. Finally, he 
insisted that the commissioners provided for in the law to 
hear fugitive slave cases could not constitutionally exercise 
judicial power because they had been endowed with 
neither the requisite tenure during  “good Behavior” nor 
the fixed salary that would ensure their independence.19
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Ju d g e  Rice, the sole Dem ocrat still on the bench,20 
adhered  to his party's position that the Fugitive Slave Law 
was valid. He brushed aside objections based on habeas 
corpus with the observation that the purpose of a habeas 
writ was merely to determ ine “w hether the process by 
which the party is held has been issued by com petent 
authority, in conform ity with the law, and is sufficient in 
form .” (He did not say how even the sum m ary procedure 
provided for in the law could be assured in view of the 
finality o f the fugitive slave court’s decision.) He also 
denied that the federal act deprived fugitives of trial by 
ju ry . Noting the prelim inary nature o f the prescribed 
process, whose sole purpose was to re tu rn  escaped parties 
to the ju risd ic tio n s from  which they had  fled for 
d isposition  th e re , Rice naively (or d isingenuously ) 
m aintained that it would “im pugn the integrity o f the 
governm ents to which the fugitives are re tu rn ed ” to 
accuse them  of failing to protect the rights o f restored 
captives.21
T he Davis-Rice debate over the constitutionality o f the 
Fugitive Slave Law was in a sense irrelevant since, as Davis 
acknowledged, the United States Suprem e C ourt had 
already sustained the statute. But there rem ained the 
q u es tio n  o f w h e th e r  M aine’s p e rso n a l lib e rty  law 
conflicted with either the Fugitive Slave Law or the 
Constitution. Expanding upon the opinions o f Tenney, 
Cutting, Goodenow, and May, Rice contended at length 
that the personal liberty law by its term s forbade state 
officials to aid in the execution of the federal act even as 
private citizens. T he Maine law, he concluded, "was 
manifestly in tended to obstruct and h inder the restoration 
o f fugitive slaves, and is in both its letter and spirit 
repugnan t to [the f ugitive slave clause] of the Constitution 
o f the U nited States.”22
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W ith the concurrence o f Davis and Kent, Ju d g e  
A ppleton  resp o n d ed  to Rice’s “nice criticisms, hair 
b read th  distinctions, and  forced constructions.” T he 
personal liberty law’s legislative history and its placem ent 
in the revised statutes together with o ther laws defining 
the duties o f state officers clearly showed that it was m eant 
to re fe r to such officers as officers, and not as private 
citizens, A ppleton argued. T herefore , it did not conflict 
with either the Fugitive Slave Law or the fugitive slave 
clause and was constitutional.23
Unlike its Rhode Island counterpart, which bowed to 
pressure and repealed its personal liberty law, the Maine 
legislature quickly responded to the judges’ opinions by 
am ending the act to m eet the m ajority’s objections.24 A 
m onth  later the C onfederate  bom bardm ent o f  Fort 
Sum ter rendered  the issue moot. T he controversy over the 
personal liberty law faded away, overshadowed by more 
pressing questions about the very natu re  of the Union and 
the conduct o f the war.
President Lincoln m ade it clear that he did not believe 
the Southern states had a right to secede, and he acted 
energetically to p u t down the “insurrection” against 
federal authority. Soon after the firing on Fort Sum ter he 
proclaim ed a blockade o f Southern ports. As an act o f war, 
the establishm ent o f  the blockade seem ed to imply 
recognition o f the Confederacy as a belligerent power 
u n d er international law. But in its E uropean diplomacy 
the adm inistration insisted that the conflict was merely a 
domestic insurrection and that foreign countries would 
have no legal justification for granting the Confederacy 
belligerent status. T he rebellion assumed a dual character: 
“T he Union G overnm ent treated the C onfederate forces as 
belligerents, even though it did not intentionally recognize 
the ir belligerency in any direct, form al m anner.”25
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A lth o u g h  the  sta tus o f  the C o n fed e racy  u n d e r  
international law was prim arily a problem  for the national 
governm ent, the question also arose in the state courts 
thanks to the exploits of Captain Raphael Semmes o f the 
C onfederate navy. U nder orders to d isrupt N orthern  
commerce, Semmes slipped the steam er Sumter past the 
federal blockade at New Orleans on Ju n e  30, 1861, and 
four days later looted and burned  his first victim, the 
B angor-ow ned  Golden Rocket, 26 T h e  m erch an tm an  s 
owners had insured their vessel before the war in both 
Maine and Massachusetts, each policy containing a clause 
exem pting the insurers from  liability for loss by “cap ture .” 
Liability thus hinged on the definition of capture, and that 
in tu rn  depended  on the legal status o f the Confederate 
governm ent.
A lthough  they en ta iled  no specific constitu tional 
provisions and so did not tu rn  on constitutional law in the 
narrow  sense, the Golden Rocket cases did involve basic 
constitutional questions: Did the Confederate governm ent 
exercise legitimate political authority? W hat was the legal 
status of military and naval forces acting under its orders? 
Some of Am erica’s most brilliant lawyers argued these 
points in the Golden Rocket litigation. In Massachusetts, 
R ich a rd  H en ry  D ana, J r . ,  w ho h ad  successfu lly  
represen ted  the governm ent in the m om entous Prize 
Cases,27 and fu ture United States Suprem e C ourt justice 
Horace Gray, Jr ., insisted on behalf o f the shipowners that 
the w ord capture as used in insurance policies had  a 
technical m eaning, referring  only to acts o f governm ent. 
But the Sumter, they said, was a pirate ship, acting under the 
commission o f an illegitimate governm ent, and therefore 
did not come within the clause exem pting the insurance 
com pany from  liability. Responding for the defendan t 
com pany, fo rm er Suprem e C ourt justice Benjam in R. 
Curtis rejected the narrow definition of'capture. Any taking 
o f a ship, w hether by a governm ent or by pirates, was a
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c a p tu re , he a rg u e d ; in any ev en t, th e  C o n fe d e ra te  
governm ent was a de facto governm ent, so the taking o f the 
Golden Rocket by the Sumter was not piratical.28
T h e  M assachusetts court agreed with Dana and Gray 
that the word capture m ust be used in its technical sense in 
construing insurance policies, but it found that even as a 
term  o f art, capture re fe rred  to any unlawful taking. 
T herefo re , even if the Sumter was a pirate, the exem ption 
clause relieved  the in su rance  com pany o f liability. 
F urtherm ore, the court accepted C urtis’s characterization 
of the C onfederate polity as a de facto governm ent, thereby 
recognizing at least the quasi validity o f C onfederate 
com missions.29
In  M aine D ana and  Gray again  rep re sen ted  the  
shipowners, with Jo h n  A. Peters, fu ture chief justice o f the 
state, as local counsel. A nd Curtis once m ore appeared  for 
the insurance com pany, assisted by Jam es S. Rowe, a 
leader o f the Bangor bar.30
Only two judges accepted Dana and  Gray’s argum ent 
that the taking o f the Golden Rocket had been piratical and 
therefore not a capture as understood in contracts o f 
insurance. A majority found for the insurance com pany 
on the g round  that the taking, w hether o r not piratical, 
had been a capture and thus within the exem ption clause. 
Ju d g e  Davis agreed  with the m ajority, bu t charac­
teristically would not let it go at that. Exam ining the issues 
at length in the only officially reported  opinion in the case, 
he rejected the position of Curtis and the Massachusetts 
court (and, as it tu rned  out, o f the Suprem e C ourt o f the 
U nited States) that the Sumter enjoyed “enem y” status 
b ecau se  it h ad  b een  co m m issio n ed  by a de fac to  
governm ent. T he Confederates were indeed "enem ies,” 
he said, but they were also traitors whose seizures o f 
A m erican ships were acts o f piracy as well as acts o f war. 
“T h e  fact that [the officers and crew o f the Sumter] were
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citizens o f States that have revolted, and are engaged in 
civil war, did not change the nature o f their acts, except to 
add to their enorm ity,” Davis declared. “T he commission 
u n d er which they acted was itself p ira tic a l .. . .” Rather 
than absolving them  from  the crime o f piracy, the fact that 
the Sumter s men had acted under the authority of a de facto 
Confederate governm ent simply added to their guilt.31
It did not strain credulity to label a C onfederate naval 
captain an enemy and a traitor; Semmes, after all, had 
taken  up arm s against the U nited  States. B ut the 
governm ent also had to contend with civilian opponents 
behind the lines. A ntiadm inistration newspapers roundly 
condem ned President Lincoln for suspending habeas 
co rpus, o rd e rin g  m ilitary a rrest, and  tak ing  o th e r 
m easures inimical to individual liberty. H istorian Jam es G. 
Randall concluded that “T here  was no real censorship, 
and in the broadest sense the press was unham pered  
though engaging in activities distinctly harm ful to the 
G overnm ent.”32 But the adm inistration did endeavor to 
muffle its most vociferous critics by denying peace papers 
the use o f the mails and in some instances shutting them  
down for limited periods. To an extent, the governm ent 
also relied on popular pressure to stifle dissent. In August, 
1861, soldiers retu rn ing  from  the Union disaster at Bull 
Run helped stir up public anger at the carping and sniping 
o f antiwar editors. T he first mob attack on a newspaper 
occurred on August 8 in Concord, New H am pshire, where 
a crowd o f soldiers and civilians destroyed the office and 
equipm ent o f the Democratic Standard. A few days later, 
rioters in Maine dem olished the office and press o f the 
Bangor Democrat.33
T he weekly Democrat and its short-lived sister paper, the 
Bangor Daily Union, were run  by Marcellus Emery, an 
ou tspoken  B reckinridge su p p o rte r. E m ery’s disloyal 
political and editorial activities outraged the citizens of
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Bangor, some o f whom th rea tened  violence against the 
person and property  o f the p ap er’s p roprie to r. O ne o f the 
city’s “leading m en” (probably the wealthy businessman 
and  fo rm er mayor Rufus Dwinel) fueled popular passions 
by o ffering  to indem nify for loss o f  time o r recovery o f 
dam ages anyone p a rtic ip a tin g  in an attack  on the 
Democrat's office. O n A ugust 12, inspired by the affair in 
Concord four days before, a mob en tered  Em ery’s office 
while he was ou t to d inner and threw  all his equipm ent 
and supplies from  a fourth-story window into the street. 
T he ed ito r appeared  in time to see his p roperty  going up 
in smoke, and he barely escaped personal violence.34
Emery resum ed publication o f the Democrat in January , 
1863, but did not dare sue the rioters until the war had 
ended. Finally, in 1866 he brought an action in W aldo 
County, far from  the scene o f destruction. Judge Rufus 
Tapley, a well-known lawyer who had been appointed to 
the bench in 1865 after briefly com m anding a volunteer 
regim ent du ring  the war, presided at the trial. T he 
defendants argued  that under the circum stances of 1861, 
the virulently antiadm inistration Democrat had been a 
public nuisance (that is, an act o r object adversely affecting 
the com m on rights o r interests o f the general public) 
which the public had a right to abate. Emery o f course 
pro tested  tha t reducing  unpopular opinion to the status o f 
a nuisance m eant obliterating free speech and a free press. 
Sym pathetic towards the rioters, Tapley had the delicate 
task o f explaining how the constitutional guarantees 
underg ird ing  free governm ent could be subordinated to 
the law o f nuisance.35
Lincoln had justified strong governm ental m easures 
that in terfered  with civil liberties by observing that the 
rebels had used the First A m endm ent as a shield for “a 
most efficient corps o f spies, inform ers, suppliers, and 
aiders and abettors o f their cause.” His m easures m ight 
have been unconstitutional in o rd inary  times, he thought,
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but not when used to preserve the very- Union for which 
the Constitution had been composed. Similarly, Tapley 
insisted that a newspaper publisher could not use 
constitutional liberties to destroy constitutional 
government. “Freedom of thought, freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press, have long been considered a 
part of republican institutions and necessary ingredients 
of them,” he said; “but this freedom has never been an 
unlimited, unrestricted right to speak, write and publish 
without accountability. The press enjoys no such privilege 
now or at any other period in the history of this country. 
Its constitutional guarantee is not to trample upon the 
rights of the individual; neither is it to destroy the very 
government which upholds, and confers upon it its 
privileges.”36
Under the circumstances, the phrase “to destroy the 
very government” implied a charge of treason. Now 
Emery was not being tried for treason, or for anything 
else; indeed, he was the plaintiff in the case. But Tapley 
insisted that a publisher who used the press to give aid and 
comfort to the enemy was guilty of treason and that his 
paper was a public nuisance liable to abatement. Tapley 
closed his charge to the jury by recalling the national 
predicament of August, 1861: the South had seceded, 
seized federal property, attacked Fort Sumter, defeated 
the Union forces at Bull Run. “All saw that divided in 
sentiment and effort we must fail, and our glorious 
inheritance perish in our own hands. All saw that our 
safety lay in a united, patriotic, self-sacrificing spirit of 
loyalty and patriotism.” Tapley thus invited the jury to 
find that Emery had been a traitor. They accepted, 
bringing in a verdict against just two of the rioters for 
destroying property not necessary for the Democrat’s 
publication and otherwise finding that “The Bangor 
Democrat of 1861 was a public nuisance, and should have
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been suppressed .” O n appeal the full bench reversed, bu t 
the basis o f  its decision can only be guessed at since no 
opinion was officially reported . Eventually the parties 
settled ou t o f court.37
O th er cases involving First A m endm ent rights grew out 
o f  the  rashness o f Southern  sympathizers who expressed 
jo y  a t th e  a ssass in a tio n  o f  P re s id e n t L inco ln . In  
Skowhegan, one N athaniel W. M orse publicly praised 
B ooth’s “spunk,” and  was forced by a group o f irate 
citizens to take back his words and  cheer the flag. Morse 
sued for trespass and  the ju ry  re tu rn ed  a verdict in his 
favor — fo r one cent.38
A similar but m ore celebrated case arose near Newport, 
w here a m an nam ed Prentiss adm itted his happiness at 
Lincoln’s death, saying, “He that draw eth the sword shall 
perish by the sword, and the ir joy shall be tu rn ed  into 
m ourn ing .” Later that day some angry townsmen, led by a 
deputy  sheriff who thought he had  authority  to arrest the 
incautious copperhead, m anhandled  Prentiss, detained 
him  fo r several hours in the local hotel, and  released him 
only after he swore to support the Constitution. Prentiss 
sued, com plaining that his constitutional rights had been 
violated and  that he had  suffered  physical harm  (a 
dislocated hip) and  em otional injury. He also dem anded 
punitive damages.
In  his charge to the ju ry , Ju d g e  Kent displayed a greater 
sensitiv ity  to w ard  th e  F irst A m en d m en t rig h ts  o f  
dissenters than  had Tapley in the Democrat case. “U nder 
the C onstitution,” he declared, “every citizen may freely 
speak, w rite and  publish  his sen tim ents upon  any 
su b jec t. . . .  H e may use the most shocking, indecent and 
revolting language, towards his own father, towards the 
G overnm ent, anywhere, at any tim e . . .  I f  freedom  of 
speech were abused, said the judge, the offender would be 
responsible, bu t only to the person injured, and  then only
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afte r a determ ination  o f liability according to legal 
procedure; “no individuals have a right to take the law into 
their own hands, and inflict punishm ent upon him .” Kent 
ru led  that Prentiss was entitled to full com pensation for 
the injury to his person, regardless o f how vexatious his 
language had been. But in regard to em otional injuries 
and to punitive damages, he perm itted  the ju ry  to consider 
the provocation u nder which the defendants had acted. 
Prentiss’s doctor having adm itted that the dislocation of 
the hip might have been due to rheum atism , the ju ry  
aw arded Prentiss only $6.46. On appeal the state suprem e 
court sustained the verdict.39
Physical resistance to the war effort seems to have been 
limited in Maine to a single fruitless attem pt by a mob of 
about fifty m en to prevent execution o f the federal 
conscription law (the Enrollm ent Act) o f 1863. Many m ore 
opposed the draft vocally, and respected legal minds 
believed that in adopting it Congress had overstepped its 
authority, in terfered  with state control over the militias, 
and im paired individual liberty. N either the United States 
Suprem e C ourt nor the Maine Suprem e Judicial C ourt 
had to pass on the constitutionality o f the conscription act, 
but the Maine bench seized the first opportunity  to make it 
known that it would reject any constitutional challenges to 
the draft. In response to an inquiry from  the governor 
concerning the paym ent by municipalities o f the draft 
com m utation fees provided for in the conscription act, the 
court observed that Congress had authority under the 
Constitution to declare war, raise military forces, suppress 
insurrections, and adopt any measures necessary and 
p roper for exercising this authority. “In a great national 
em ergency, when the national unity and republican 
institutions are in peril,” said the court, Congress “has the 
right to com m and all the resources o f the nation, and the 
lives o f its citizens, to p re v e n t. . that fearful anarchy,
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which would be so im m inent, if its dissolution should 
become an accomplished fact.1140
T h e  federal law which the court thus upheld allowed a 
d rafted  m an to avoid service perm anently  by procuring a 
substitute (until the next call for troops) by paying a three 
h u n d re d  do lla r com m utation  fee. T hese provisions 
aggravated problem s plaguing the military mobilization 
effort since the outbreak of the war. Towns had been 
offering bounties to encourage enlistm ent, even though 
they lacked legal authority to do so, and the legislature 
periodically had to rectify the situation with statutes 
ratifying such municipal actions. T he size o f the bounties 
increased when localities, anxious to m eet assigned quotas 
and thus avoid local drafts under the Militia Act o f  1862 
and the Enrollm ent Act o f 1863, inaugurated a bidding 
war for volunteers. Some towns also contributed toward 
the hiring of substitutes, the cost o f which increased 
dramatically after Congress repealed the com m utation 
section o f the d raft act in 1864.
As bounties and the price of substitutes skyrocketed, 
so did municipal debt. D uring the first year o f the war, 
M aine’s cities and towns paid out ju s t over $200,000 in 
bounties. From  the July, 1862, call for troops until 
O ctober of the following year, they paid or pledged nearly 
$2 million for bounties, com m utation fees, and the hiring 
o f substitutes. For the th ree and a half m onths between the 
O ctober 17, 1863, call and the call o f February 1, 1864, the 
cost exceeded $2 million. Finally, the bill for bounties, 
substitutes, and recruiting expenses from  February, 1864, 
until the end o f the war surpassed $4.7 million. T he grand 
total o f municipal expenses for these and o ther war 
purposes: over $11 million.41
A fter the war many towns, particularly in poor areas of 
the state, cried out for the state to assume and thereby 
equalize the bu rden  of municipal war debts. In urging
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assum ption upon the legislature, G overnor Joshua L. 
Cham berlain asserted that due to the distribution of 
M aine’s wealth and population and the necessity for poor 
towns to com pete with affluent ones to meet their quotas, 
it had  cost some localities six times as much as others “in 
proportion  to their m eans” to send a soldier to the field. 
T he state suprem e court issued an advisory opinion 
declaring that a proposed rem edial bill would violate the 
constitutional provision setting a debt ceiling for the state, 
but the people authorized an exception by constitutional 
am en d m en t and  the leg isla tu re  ad o p ted  a lim ited  
assum ption and equalization scheme in 1868.42
Even after partial assumption, M aine’s municipalities 
staggered un d er a heavy burden  of debt, and local officials 
often  refused to recognize bounty claims. In the many 
instances where claimants were bounty jum pers, substitute 
brokers, eleventh-hour enlistees, or others who sought to 
share in the municipal largesse w ithout having faced the 
perils o f battle, the reluctance of local authorities to pay up 
was especially understandable.43 T he suprem e judicial 
court frequently found grounds for sustaining the towns’ 
refusal to satisfy bounty claims: the town meetings at 
which bounties had been voted had not been properly 
called; claimants were not covered by the bounty votes; the 
votes had not been ratified by the legislature.44 But the 
c o u r t n ev e r h e ld  th e  p ay m en t o f  b o u n tie s  
unconstitutional.
C om m utation  fees were a d iffe re n t m atte r. T h e  
provision in the federal conscription law that allowed a 
draftee tem porarily to avoid service by paying three 
h undred  dollars made it harder for com munities to meet 
their quotas and drove up the level o f  bounties. Between 
July, 1862, and October, 1863, nearly three-quarters o f 
th e  th re e -y e a r  m en d ra f te d  in M aine p a id  th e  
com m utation fee. T he towns helped them  defray the cost
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of escaping military service by paying out more than 
$115,000 for commutations. Noting the concern on the 
part o f “many good citizens that serious complications and 
em barrassm ents may result to the towns which pledge 
their credit to raise money to supply these com m utations 
as well as to individuals who advance the money therefo r,” 
G overnor Abner Coburn asked the court in June of 1863 
w hether the state constitution perm itted towns to pledge 
their credit or levy taxes for the paym ent of the fees.45
T he court answered with a unanim ous, em phatic “no.” 
Pointing out that the purpose o f the draft was to raise 
men, not money, the court declared it the duty o f every 
citizen to defend the "governm ent upon the prosperity 
and perpetuity of which the fu ture hopes o f hum anity 
must rest.” The conscription act made it the personal 
obligation of each drafted  man to serve in the arm ed 
forces, furnish a substitute, or pay the com m utation fee. 
The governor’s query therefore boiled down to a question 
o f w hether towns could raise money to gratuitously 
discharge the personal obligations o f its citizens. Various 
statutes em powered towns to spend public money for 
“necessary town charges,” but these the court defined to 
"only embrace all incidental expenses arising directly or 
indirectly in the due and legitimate exercise of the various 
powers conferred by statute” (the building of roads, the 
support of schools, the relief of the poor, and so on). 
Raising money to give away to private citizens so that they 
could avoid the perform ance of duties owing to a nation in 
peril did not fall within the powers conferred by statute. 
T herefore , the court concluded, towns had no authority to 
pay com m utation fees.46
After the war, the Maine court applied the “public 
purpose” doctrine (that the governm ent constitutionally 
could use public money only for public purposes) in 
several co m m u ta tio n  an d  boun ty  cases, the m ost 
significant o f which was Perkins v. Milford. T he town of
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M ilford had voted to pay two h u n d red  dollars to each man 
credited  to its d raft quota, provided that local citizens 
raised a six h undred  dollar fund toward the same end* 
Subsequently the voters approved refunds to the fu n d ’s 
subscribers, but the town treasurer refused to honor the 
refund  orders when presented for paym ent. C hief Justice 
A ppleton wrote for the court that the ref und had not been 
legitimized by later legislation, but added that even if it 
had been within one o f the ratification acts, the vote would 
have been invalid on constitutional grounds. Subscribers 
to the fund had not expected repaym ent, he said. T heir 
contributions had been gifts to the town. T here  being no 
contractual quid pro quo, the refunds would in tu rn  be gifts 
from  the town to the subscribers. T he issue then was 
w h e th e r  the  tow n cou ld  “ raise m oney to give to 
individuals. This is not a gift for any public purpose. It is a 
gift as a recom pense for past generosity. If  a town can give 
to A, it can give to B. If it can give little, it can give much. If 
it can give, then every man holds his estate subject to the 
will o f the majority, who can give away as much or as little 
as they please.” T he right o f the governm ent to impose 
taxes for public purposes was un lim ited , A ppleton  
concluded, but the “constitution gives no authority to raise 
money to give away . If it did, all protection to property  
would ceases.”47
In  one  o f  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t c o n s titu tio n a l 
developm ents of the postwar period, courts soon carried 
over the public purpose doctrine from  com m utation and 
bounty cases to controversies over m unicipal aid to 
selected private enterprises. It then became clear that the 
doctrine rested on the idea o f equality before the law. As 
A ppleton explained  in an influential opinion, “O ur 
governm ent is based on equality o f right. T he State cannot 
discrim inate am ong occupations, for a discrim ination in 
favor o f one is a discrim ination adverse to all others. While 
the State is bound to protect all, it ceases to give that ju st
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protection when it affords undue advantages, o r gives 
special and exclusive preferences to particular individuals 
and particular and special industries at the cost and charge 
o f the rest o f  the com m unity.” It m ade no difference that a 
majority o f the town’s taxpayers had voted in favor of 
public aid. W hether enacted by a popularly controlled 
governm ent o r by a privileged elite, legislation favoring 
particular classes o f the population violated the principle 
o f equality. H ere, as in Perkins, A ppleton declared, “All 
security o f private rights, all protection o f private property  
is at an end . ..  when the power is given to a majority to 
lend or give away the property o f  an unwilling m inority.”48
T hus the Civil W ar era in Maine closed on the same 
constitutional note with which it had opened. In his 
opinion on the Dred Scott decision, John  A ppleton had 
insisted that American governm ent rested on the principle 
o f “the equality o f all before the law.” And W oodbury 
Davis had argued that the authors o f  the Declaration o f 
Independence m eant what they said about equality: that 
majority rule did not justify majority tyranny. Now, after a 
war that had ended as a fight fo r em ancipation, and 
following the ratification of a constitutional am endm ent 
m aking “equal protection” the law o f the land, the Maine 
court reaffirm ed the cardinal tenet o f the American 
political creed. By restricting governm ental activity to the 
fulfillm ent o f public purposes, it sought to ensure that 
dem ocratic political power would not be wielded for the 
private benefit o f some (even if that “some” constituted a 
majority); and that minorities, w hether racial or economic, 
rich or poor, received the equal protection of the laws.49
152
NOTES
*Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-12 (1857); Res. 
of 15 April 1857, ch. 112, 1857 Me. Res. 60; Bangor Daily Whig and 
Courier, March 12, 1857; Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. 505 (1857).
2Bangor Daily Whig and Courier, Oct. 19, 1855; Austin Willey, The 
History of the Antislavery Cause in State and Nation (Portland, Me.: B. 
Thurston and Hoyt, Fogg 8c Donham, 1866; reprint ed., Miami, Fla.: 
Mnemosyne Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 221, 224-25, 290-91; Edward L. 
Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, 4 vols. (Boston: Roberts 
Bros., 1887), 1: 152, 154, 157-58; Charles Eugene Hamlin, The Life and 
Times of Hannibal Hamlin, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 
1899; reprint ed., Port Washington, N.Y.. Kennikat Press, 1971), 1: 
235. The other members of the bench in 1857 were Chief Justice John 
S. Tenney (Whig), Jonas Cutting (Whig-Republican), Daniel Goodenow 
(Republican), and Joshua Hathaway (Democrat).
3Constitutionalist [Augusta, Ga.], March 15, 1857, quoted in Don E. 
Fehrenbacker, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and 
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 418.
4Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. at 516-21.
5The primacy of state citizenship was suggested rather than explicitly 
advanced in Rice’s opinion. According to one historian, most 
antebellum courts “maintained a judicious silence" on the question "of 
whether state citizenship flowed from national citizenship or vice 
versa.” Congress Finally defined U.S. citizenship in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, made all 
native-born Americans “citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.1’ James H. Kettner, The Development of American 
Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1978), pp. 264-65, 341-43.
6Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. at 507-16.
7Ibid., pp. 557, 559, 591-92.
%Ibid., pp. 556-57.
9Ibid., pp. 563, 573.
10Seth May to Austin Willey, Feb. 13, 1844, in Liberty Standard 
[Hallowell, Me.], Feb. 29, 1844. Apparently, May also accepted political 
criteria rather than birth and allegiance as defining elements of 
citizenship, for he concurred in Rice’s opinion rather than in 
Appleton’s.
“ Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. at 589, 594.
153
12Herman Belz, Emancipation and Equal Rights: Politics and 
Constitutionalism in the Civil War Era (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 42; 
Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. at 568, 594.
lzBangor Daily Whig and Courier, Sept. 7, 1857; John Appleton to 
Israel Washburn, Feb. 7, 1859, Israel Washburn Papers, Library of 
Congress; Norman L. Rosenberg, “Personal Liberty Laws and Sectional 
Crisis, 1850-1861,” Civil War History 17 (March 1971): 43. For a sample 
of the debate among Maine Republicans on repeal of the personal 
liberty law, see the Bangor Whig and Courier, Jan. 10, 12, 15, 1861.
14Passed as part of the Compromise of 1850 to replace an older and 
weaker statute, the Fugitive Slave Law authorized a slaveowner to seize 
an alleged fugitive, take him before a federal judge or judicially 
appointed commissioner, and upon identification of the prisoner 
receive a certificate for his return to the state from which he supposedly 
had fled. To establish his right to the fugitive, a claimant simply had to 
present an authenticated copy of his testimony in a court in his home 
state as to the ownership and escape of the slave. The captive could not 
testify, and all other courts and magistrates were prohibited from 
interfering with his removal. See Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave 
Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 3-25.
15James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction 
(New York: Knopf, 1982), pp. 79-90; Rosenberg, “Personal Liberty 
Laws,” pp. 28n., 31-34; Maine, Acts and Resolves, 1855, ch. 182, p. 207 
(“Public Laws”) (Acts and Resolves contain three separately paginated 
sections: “Public Laws,” “Private Laws,” and “Resolves.” To simplify 
retrieval, the appropriate section is indicated after the page number); 
“Governor Wells’ Address,” in Maine, Acts and Resolves, 1856, p. 393 
(“Resolves”).
16“Governor Washburn’s Address,” in Maine, Acts and Resolves, 1861, 
p. 85 (“Resolves”). The original and revised personal liberty laws are 
reproduced in Opinions of the Justices, 46 Me. 561 (1861). See 
especially Judge Appleton’s opinions for the legislative history.
17John Appleton to Charles Sumner, April 6, 1861, Charles Sumner 
Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Tenney and Cutting 
also found the provision forbidding magistrates to aid in the detention 
or return of fugitives unconstitutional. May and Goodenow felt that the 
wording of this statute was such that it applied to magistrates only in 
their official capacity and was therefore unconstitutional.
‘“Opinions of the Justices, 46 Me. at 609-10.
154
19Ibid., pp. 610-14. For a discussion of these and other constitutional 
objections to the Fugitive Slave Law, see Campbell, Slave Catchers, pp. 
26-48.
20Rice resigned in 1863 to assume the presidency of the Portland and 
Kennebec Railroad. The next Democrat tc be appointed was Artemas 
Libbey in 1875. However, former Democrats were appointed in the 
interim. Joseph G. Dickerson, a Democrat until the Civil War, helped 
form the Union party in Maine. John A. Peters joined the Democrats 
when the Whig party disintegrated in the 1850s, but he too switched to 
the Union party and later became a Republican.
21Opinions of the Justices, 46 Me. at 571-72.
22Ibid., p. 578.
2Hbid., pp. 586, 595.
24Rhode Island, Acts, 1861, ch. 358, p. 120; Maine, Acts and Resolves, 
1861, ch. 58, p. 36 (“Public Laws”).
25David M. Silver, Lincolns Supreme Court (Urbana, 111.. University of 
Illinois Press, 1956), p. 104; J G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under 
Lincoln, rev. ed. (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1951), p. 67.
26Semmes recounted the capture and destruction of the Golden Rocket 
in Memoirs oj Service Afloat, During the War Between the States (Baltimore: 
Kelly, Piet Sc Co., 1868), pp. 126-31. In its first two days of action, the 
Sumter took four Maine vessels. Of the eighteen prizes captured by the 
Sumter during its se\en-month run as a pri\ateer, eight were from 
Maine. S eeThe Cruise of the Alabama and the Sumter (New York: Carleton, 
1864), Appendix No. I, pp. 239-41.
21 T he Prize Cases, in which the Supreme Court upheld the legalitv of 
the blockade, are discussed in Silver, Lincoln 5 Supreme Court, pp. 104-18.
28Dole \. New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 373 
(1863).
29Ibid.
30Dana and Peters had collaborated before in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 
Me. 379 (1854), one of the leading cases of the nineteenth century on 
Bible-reading in the public schools. Rowe had opposed them on that 
occasion too.
31Dole v. Merchants’ Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465, 471 (1863). 
The United States Supreme Court accepted the “de facto government” 
argument put forward by Curtis in Mauran v. Insurance Co., 73 U.S., (6 
Wall.) 1 (1867). Caleb Cushing, counsel for the insurance company, 
submitted the Dana-Gray brief from Dole. See also Dole v. New
England M ut Marine Dis. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No.
155
3966), another case arising from the capture of the Golden Rocket and 
involving Dana, Gray, and Curtis as counsel.
32Randall, Constitutional Problems, p. 520.
33Dean Sprague, Freedom Under Lincoln (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1965), pp. 130-34.
34John E. Godfrey, “Bangor,” in History of the Press of Maine, ed. by 
Joseph Griffin (Brunswick: J. Griffin, 1872), pp. 137-39; Louis C. 
Hatch, ed., Maine: A History (New York: The American Historical 
Society, 1919; reprint ed., Somersworth, N.H.: New Hampshire 
Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 437-39.
35proceedings of the York Bar in Relation to the Death of Hon. Rufus 
P. Tapley, 85 Me. 579 (1893); Bangor Daily Whig and Courier, Oct. 25, 
1866.
36McPherson, Ordeal, p. 295; Bangor Daily Whig and Courier, Oct. 25, 
1866.
^Bangor Daily Whig and Courier, Oct. 25, 1866; Herbert T. Silsby, II,' 
“Chief Justice John A. Peters,” Pt. 2, Maine Bar Bulletin, Sept. 1971, pp. 
22-23.
:iHBangor Daily Whig and Courier, Jan. 21, 1867.
^Bangor Daily Whig and Cornier, April 23, 1867, Silsby, “Peters,” p. 23; 
Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Me. 427 (1869) (Kent, J.).
40Hatch, Maine, pp. 494-95; Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 
271-74; Opinions of the Justices, 52 Me. 595-96.
41These figures are drawn from a synopsis of the report of a 
commission appointed by the governor to investigate the question of 
state assumption of municipal war debts. The synopsis appeared in the 
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1969), pp. 328-29.
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valuation tor bounties, while the towns ot Penobscot County had paid 
8.63 percent.
43Bounty jumpers were, as one wartime chief executive explained, 
“Men . . . base enough . . .  to enlist, get their bounty and desert, go to 
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